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44 BEVERLY HILLS BAR JOURNAL 
WILL YOUR HONOR PLEASE WITHDRAWl 
By ALAN M. MUND 
of the law firm of Fulop, Rolston, Burns & McKittrick, Beverly Hills 
The Superior Court of Lang County, 
California, has three judges. One pre-
sides and handles administrative duties. 
Another hears virtually all of the crim-
inal matters pending in the court. The 
third considers himself a specialist in 
civil matters. The latter, whom we 
shall call Judge Friend, automatically 
hears the law and motion calendar of 
the court each Friday. Occasionally, of 
course, the other two judges, Presiding 
Judge Curet and Criminal Judge Paint-
er, hear civil matters, but this is not 
their usual assignment. 
The court is located in the county 
seat, a city of fifteen thousand. Of the 
fifty-two lawyers in the county, one 
law firm handles a majority of the mat-
ters in the court. 
In July, 1968, a resident of Texas 
filed an action for a permanent in-
junction against a savings and loan as-
sociation, seeking to restrain the de-
fendant from proceeding with its then 
pending non-judicial foreclosure. The 
action was filed by Don Rumm, plain-
tiff's Los Angeles attorney, in associa-
tion with Jim Wolf, a senior partner 
of that most active law firm in the 
county. 
Two months later, after the filing of 
affidavits both pro and con, the plain-
tiff's motion for a preliminary injunc-
tion was heard by Judge Friend. The 
defendant appeared by its Los An-
geles counsel, Ronald Scott. After con-
siderable argument, Judge Friend is-
sued a preliminary injunction. 
For the next year, various motions 
were made by the defendant through 
its Los Angeles counsel, among which 
were motions to dissolve and/ or modify 
the preliminary injunction, change 
venue, advance and specially set for 
trial. All were heard by Judge Friend 
and all were denied. 
After having eight (8) motions in 
succession denied, and believing that at 
least some were good on their face, 
Scott detected a strong odor of seafood, 
and determined that it was now neces-
sary to associate local counsel. He 
therefore telephoned Walter Thomas, 
a former president of the Lang County 
Bar Association, and invited Thomas 
to join in representing the defend-
ant. Before accepting, Thomas request-
ed some information on the nature and 
status of the case. Scott gave Thomas 
all the information he requested, in-
cluding the names of counsel represent-
ing the plaintiff. 
Thomas, asked, "Are you aware 
that prior to assuming the bench, 
Judge Friend was the law partner of 
Jim Wolf?" 
Scott replied that he had no knowl-
edge of that fact ; and that he was 
shocked that Judge Friend had not dis-
closed that information . The odor 
which Scott had previously detected 
was now considerably more distinct. 
And two weeks later, it became over-
whelming. 
Over cocktails, Scott was discussing 
the matter with an attorney from San 
Francisco. Through this conversation, 
Scott discovered that prior to his ap-
pointment, Judge Friend had been a 
trial associate of plaintiff's other coun-
sel, Mr. Rumm, on numerous matters. 
A pretrial conference was then pend-
ing and scheduled to be heard by Judge 
Friend. Scott immediately filed a decla-
ration of prejudice pursuant to Code 
of Civil Procedure, § 170.6 to disquali-
fy Judge Friend from sitting in any fur-
ther matter relating to the case. 
Four days before the date set for the 
pretrial conference, Rumm and Wolf 
filed a motion to strike the declaration 
of prejudice. Judge Friend himself 
signed the order shortening time for 
service. 
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Four days later Judge Curet heard 
and granted the motion to strike the 
declaration of prejudice, on the ground 
that Judge Friend had already heard 
the motion for preliminary injunction ; 
and that therefore the declaration of 
prejudice had not been timely filed . 
Every motion from that point on 
was scheduled before Judge Friend. 
Each time Scott and Thomas filed decla-
rations of prejudice. Each was rebuffed 
by Judge Friend. But at no time did 
Judge Friend or Rumm or Wolf ac-
knowledge the judge's former associa-
tions. 
Three questions of law are present-
ed by these facts: 
1. Whether in view of the provisions 
of Code of Civil Procedure, § 170.6, 
a judge has a duty to inform all counsel 
of any prior relationship of his to any 
party or counsel prior to hearing con-
tested issues of fact; 
2. Whether, upon discovery of a 
judge's concealment of his prior rela-
tionship with counsel for one side, the 
opposing party is entitled to disqualify 
the judge under Code of Civil Pro-
cedure, § 170.6; and 
3. Whether a hearing on a motion 
for preliminary injunction involves "a 
determination of contested fact issues 
relating to the merits" which precludes 
the later filing of a declaration of dis-
qualification under Code of Civil Pro-
cedure, § 170.6. 
Novelty and Importance 
of the Question 
In 1946, the Honorable Robert J ack-
son, Associate Justice of the Supreme 
Court of the United States, then on 
leave of absence for special duty at 
the Nuremberg trials, accused the Hon-
orable Hugo Black, then and now an 
Associate Justice of the Court, of in-
volvement in a conflict of interest and 
of improperly participating in the de-
cision of Jewell Ridge Coal Corpora-
tion v. Local No. 6167, 325 U.S. 161, 
65 S.Ct. 1063,89 L.Ed. 1534 (1945). 
Justice Jackson argued that Justice 
Black's former partnership with one of 
the attorneys representing a party in 
45 
the matter should have immediately 
disqualified him, even though his as-
sociation had ended almost twenty (20) 
years before (in 1926) , when Justice 
Black was elected a United States Sen-
ator . Justice Jackson 's premise (which 
was not adopted) was that the fact of 
past association, no matter how dis-
tant, is, in and of itself, grounds for 
disqualification, the primary criterion 
being preservation of not only the ac-
tuality but the appearance of judicial 
impartiality. The controversy created 
headlines. (See New Y ork Times, June 
II , 1946, page 2) . 
In the Jewell Ridge episode, all par-
ties knew of Justice Black's former part-
nership. What should happen , how-
ever, in the case where a judge, know-
ing that a former partner and a former 
trial associate will be appearing before 
him and further knowing that the op-
posing parties and counsel are unaware 
of the former relationships, fails to dis-
close those facts, thereby precluding 
the opposing party from utilizing his 
essentially peremptory right to dis-
qualify? 
The nature and extent of the past 
relationships, and whether the judge 
was or is impartial , and whether the 
judge should disqualify himself, are all 
immaterial. Code of Civil Procedure 
§ 170.6 is a statute designed to guaran-
tee the appearance of fairness to liti-
gants in California courts. Can the ap-
pearance of fairness be maintained if a 
litigant is precluded from exercising his 
right under the statute because of a 
judge's failure to disclose material facts? 
At stake is the integrity, and there-
fore the efficacy, of our system of ad-
ministration of justice. The judiciary 
bears the primary responsibility of pre-
serving the integrity of our system, and 
the respect it must command in order 
to fulfill its function . The issue is most 
timely. (Witness the furore over the 
Carswell and Haynsworth nominations, 
leading to the promulgation of conflict-
of-interest rules for the judiciary by the 
committee chaired by former Chief 
Justice of California Roger Traynor, 
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and the introduction in the United 
States Senate of The Judicial Reform 
Act, S. 1506-1516, 91 st Cong., 1 st 
Sess. (1969).) 
The questions therefore squarely 
posed are as follows: (1) Is the fact 
that a judge has failed to disclose his 
former association with counsel for one 
side grounds for a challenge based 
upon the provisions of Code of Civil 
Procedure § 170.6? (2) If so, when 
is such a challenge timely made? 
I 
Justice Must Not Only Be Done; It 
Must Appear To Be Done. 
Courts worldwide have held that a 
judge must not only be unbiased but 
appear unbiased. For example, in 
U'ren v. Bagley, 118 Ore. 77, 82, 245 
P. 1074, 1075 (1926), the court 
stated: 
"Courts, like Caesar's wife, must 
be not only virtuous but above sus-
picion. " 
The California Supreme Court, in 
Johnson v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. 2d 
693 , 697,329 P.2d 5 (1958), said: 
"It is important, of course, not 
only that the integrity and fairness 
of the judiciary be maintained, but 
also that the business of the courts 
be conducted in such a manner as 
will avoid suspicion." 
(See also Rosenfield v. Vosper, 45 
Cal. App. 2d 365, 114 P.2d 29 (1941); 
Rex v. Sussex Justices, 1 K.B . 256, 93 
L.J.K.B. 129 (1924); Dotson v. Bur-
chett , 301 Ky. 28, 190 S.W.2d 697, 
162 A.L.R. 636 (1945); and 75 Harv. 
L.R. 1660 (1961) discussing 28 
U.S.c. §144.) 
II 
Despite a Lack of Direct Authority 
A II A nalogous Precedent Requires 
Disclosure. 
The paucity of precedent apparent-
ly arises, in large part, from the fact 
that most judges habitually disclose 
past associations at the outset of an 
action. No court has decided a case in-
volving such a challenge to a judge. 
(Frank, Disqualification of Judges, 56 
Yale L.J. 605 (1947).) However, in 
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Commonwealth Coatings Corporation 
v. Continental Casualty Company, 393 
U.S. 145, 89 S.Ct. 337, 21 L.Ed. 2d 
301 (1968), in review of an arbitra-
tors' decision, it was held that the 
award must be set aside because one 
of the arbitrators had failed to dis-
close his prior business dealings with 
a litigant, which facts were not dis-
covered until after the hearings on ar-
bitration ended and the award had 
been made. 
Justice Black delivered the opinion 
of the court. At 393 U.S. 147, he 
stated: 
"It is true that petitioner does not 
charge before us that the third arbi-
trator was actually guilty of fraud or 
bias in deciding this case, and we 
have no reason, apart from the un-
disclosed business relationship, to 
suspect him of any improper mo-
tives. But neither this arbitrator nor 
the prime contractor gave to peti-
tioner even an intimation of the 
close financial relations that had ex-
isted between them for a period of 
years. We have no doubt that if a 
litigant could show that a foreman 
of a jury or a judge in a court of jus-
tice had, unknown to the litigant, 
any such relationship, the judgment 
would be subject to challenge." (Em-
phasis supplied) 
In the case of courts, Justice Black 
said, it is a constitutional principle that 
a judge may not be biased or partial. 
California follows the Common-
wealth reasoning. In Johnston v. Se-
curity Insurance Company, 6 Cal. App. 
3d 839,86 Cal. Rptr. 133 (1970), one 
of the parties to arbitration discovered 
after the award that a supposedly neu-
tral arbitrator had in fact been pre-
viously associated with the claimant's 
counsel and with the claimant's ap-
praiser. The court held, at page 843: 
" ... The fact that no actual fraud 
or bias was charged or proved 
against the neutral umpire is im-
material. We do not intend by our 
decision to imply any actual wrong 
dealings by [the appraiser, the "neu-
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tral" umpire] , or by claima~ts' 
counsel. Nevertheless, [the umpire] 
was under a legal duty to 'disclose to 
the parties any dealings th~t mi~ht 
create an impression of possible biaS' 
at the outset of the hearings. " 
Judge Friend's position is almost 
identical to that of the arbitrators in 
Commonwealth and in Johnston. His 
failure to disclose his previous relation-
ship with Rumm and Wolf crea~es the 
"impression of bias" an~ (even If .such 
relationship would not III and of Itself 
be grounds for his disqualification) 
must constitute the basis for a chal-
lenge under Code of Civil Procedure 
§ 170.6, having been timely made once 
the facts were ascertained. 
III 
The Standard of Disclosure Re-
quired of a Judge Must Be At 
Least Equal to That Required of a 
Juror. 
The general rule in California and 
throughout the country is that no ve~­
dict can be impeached by an affidavit 
of a juror. However, one of the excep-
tions to the rule is directly analogous 
to the issue here. That exception is 
court-made and permits a juror to 
testify about occurrences during the 
trial or deliberations which disclose a 
juror's bias existing at the time of the 
voir dire examination which , if truth-
fully declared in answer to questions 
actually put on voir dire , would have 
been the basis for a challenge for 
cause, but which was concealed by un-
truthful answers and could not have 
been detected before the end of the 
trial by the party prejudiced . (A case 
that collects and discusses most of the 
California precedents on this subject is 
Shipley v. Permanente Hospital, 127 
Cal. App. 2d 417 , 274 P.2d 53 
(1954). ) 
The policy underlying the exception 
to the rule regarding jurors is the 
same as the policy expressed i!1. Cod~ 
of Civil Procedure 170.6: lIttgants 
belief in impartiality, leading as it d.oes 
to respect for the legal process, reqUIres 
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that a litigant be given an opport~nity 
to invoke his right to challenge, either 
peremptorily or for cause, those wh?m 
he believes or fears may not be Im-
partial. 
Similarly it is unnecessary that con-
cealment of the facts which might or 
would give rise to the cha!lenge b~ in-
tentional or deliberate. It IS the failure 
to disclose, not the reason for conceal-
ment that is determinative. 
A~other important similarity is the 
fact that whether or not the party kept 
in ignorance wou.ld h.aye raised. ~he 
challenge is not dlsposlttve. Depnvmg 
him of the opportunity to make that 
choice is enough. 
It is scarcely necessary to comment 
that a judge should have an even 
higher duty than a juro~ with ~egard. to 
disclosure of facts which might give 
rise to a challenge against his impar-
tiality, and a declaration for disq~~1i­
fication . There is no statutory proVIsion 
which permits voir dire examination 
of a judge. Therefore, it should be 
mandatory that a judge disclose any 
facts which might reasonably prompt a 
litigant to exercise his rights under 
Code of Civil Procedure § 170.6. Any 
lesser standard would constitute an im-
plicit denigration of the entire system 
of justice under which we operate. 
IV 
A Judge Must Be Held to a Standard of 
Disclosure at Least Equal to That 
Required of an Attorney Who 
Represents Two Clients With 
Conflicting Interests. 
The case of Lysick v. Walcom , 258 
Cal. App. 2d 136, 147, 65 Cal. .R'p~r. 
406 (1968), discusses the responsl~Jllty 
owed by an attorney to his dual chents 
under the Rules of Professional Con-
duct. It requires that the attorney "dis-
close all facts and circumstances which, 
in the judgment of a lawyer of ordinary 
skill and capacity, are necessary to ~n­
able his client to make free and Ill-
telligent decisions regarding the subject 
matter of the representation." 
Just as a client has the right to de-
mand that his attorney fully disclose 
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any conflicting interest, so, too, a liti-
gant has a right to expect that a judge 
who determines the issues in his cause 
will fuJly disclose any facts which show 
bias or prejudice, including prior as-
sociations with a litigant or his counsel. 
If a client is entitled to make a de-
cision as to the retention of a lawyer 
having a conflict of interests, so too 
should a litigant be entitled to make a 
free and intelligent decision whether to 
invoke the provisions of Code of Civil 
Procedure § 170.6, after a full and 
complete disclosure by the judge of all 
facts and circumstances which would 
enable such litigant to make a free 
and intelligent decision. 
To deny a litigant knowledge of 
facts and circurr.stances upon which to 
base an intelligent decision is to deny 
him the power to exercise his rights 
under Code of Civil Procedure § 170.6. 
V 
The Right to Disqualify Under 
Code of Civil Procedure §170.6 
Is Unconditional, and Cannot Be 
Waived or Lost Due to Con-
cealment of the Facts That Would 
Have Caused Its Invocation 
Immediately after learning of Judge 
Friend's former associations, Scott and 
Thomas filed the declaration of preju-
dice required under Code of Civil Pro-
cedure § 170.6. Judge Friend had pre-
viously issued a preliminary injunction. 
Judge Curet ordered the declaration 
stricken on the grounds that since 
Judge Friend had previously presided 
at the hearing for the preliminary in-
junction, subsequent filing of the decla-
ration under Code of Civil Procedure 
§ 170.6 was untimely. 
Such blind allegiance to the literal 
wording of a code section has been 
taken to task in numerous cases and 
treatises. For example, in 79 Harvard 
Law Review, 1435 at 1444 (1966) , the 
editors state : 
"Whatever deadline is set, some 
affiants will have 'good cause' for 
filing late. Discovery, after the dead-
line, of facts indicating the judge's 
.. , 
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bias presently constitutes good cause 
for late filing." 
(See also Hurd v. Letts, 152 F.2d 
121 (U.S.c.A. D.C. 1945) and Hend-
rickson v. Superior Court, 85 Ariz. 10, 
330 P.2d 507 (1958) , noted in 1 Ariz. 
L.R. 167 (1959).) 
The right to disqualify is essentially 
peremptory. (Oak Grove School Dis-
trict v. City Title Ins. Co., 217 Cal. 
App. 2d 678, 703, 32 Cal. Rptr. 288 
(1963) . Code of Civil Procedure 
§ 170.6, unlike Code of Civil Procedure 
§ 170, does not require a statement of 
any facts upon which the moving party 
seeks to disqualify a judge for bias and 
prejudice. All that is required is a 
statement that the party or his attorney 
believes that he cannot have a fair and 
impartial trial or hearing. 
In Johnson v. Superior Court, supra, 
at page 697, the California Supreme 
Court held Code of Civil Procedure 
§ 170.6 to be constitutional. In fact, 
subparagraph (5) of the section speci-
fies the form to be filed thereunder: 
"- ---- -- -- -- -- --_ , being first duly sworn, 
deposes and says: That he is a 
party (or attorney for a party) to 
the within action (or special proceed-
ing) . That __ _______ _______ the judge or 
court commissioner before whom the 
trial of the (or a hearing in the) 
aforesaid action (or special proceed-
ing) is pending (or to whom it is 
assigned) , is prejudiced against the 
party (or his attorney) or the in-
terest of the party (or his attorney) 
so that affiant cannot Or believes 
that he cannot have a fair and im-
partial trial or hearing before such 
judge or court commissioner." (Em-
phasis supplied) 
Therefore, the question of timeliness 
under Code of Civil Procedure, § 170.6 
can be decided only in the context of 
the state of the defendant's knowledge 
of the relevant facts . It is both imprac-
tical and impossible to require a party 
to file an affidavit of prejudice against 
a judge when that judge (or oppos-
ing counsel) fails to disclose facts 
which would have prompted the de-
, . . 
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fendant to file such an affidavit, and 
when the defendant had no indepen-
dent knowledge of, and no reason to 
question any third party concerning, 
the judge's former associations. 
VI 
A Ruling on a Motion for a Pre-
liminary Injunction Does Not 
Preclude Filing an Affidavit of 
Prejudice Under Code of Civil 
Procedure §I70.6 
In Kohn v. Superior Court, 239 Cal. 
App. 2d 428, 430, 48 Cal. Rptr. 832 
( 1966) , the court stated: 
" . . . it is crystal clear . . . that a 
motion to disqualify a judge [under 
section 170.6] can now be made 
after any hearing or proceeding held 
prior to trial which does not involve 
a determination of a contested fact 
issue relating to the merits. " 
The court in Kohn concluded that a 
motion to disqualify after a determina-
tion of probable cause under Penal 
Code §995 is timely and is, as a matter 
of law, made before a determination 
of the factual issues relating to the 
merits of the case. 
However, as pure obiter dictum 
having no relation to the holding of the 
case, the court, at page 430, stated: 
"A typical example of a prelim-
inary proceeding which involves a 
determination of fact issues relating 
to the merits would be a hearing on 
a motion for a preliminary injunc-
tion where the judge actually weighs 
evidence and resolves conflicts 
(Voeltz v. Bakery etc. Union , 40 
Cal. 2d 382, 386 [254 P.2d 553])." 
The court's reliance on Voeltz is mis-
placed . Voeltz neither expressly nor 
impliedly says that. As a matter of fact, 
the court in Voeltz acknowledged its 
inability to make a determination re-
lating to the merits, or resolve conflicts, 
with the result that the court issued the 
preliminary injunction so as to main-
tain the status quo. 
The issuance of a preliminary in-
junction does not result from the resolu-
tion of conflicts and weighing evidence 
relating to the merits which might pre-
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clude a challenge thereafter under 
Code of Civil Procedure § 170.6. The 
point is succinctly made in Anderson 
v. Joseph, 146 Cal. App. 2d 450, 303 
P.2d 1053 (1956), where the court 
stated (p. 454) : 
" ... unless based upon stipulation 
or other satisfactory showings sub-
mitting the cause on the merits, the 
court was without jurisdiction to de-
termine the merits upon the hearing 
of a motion for a temporary injunc-
tion and the orders purporting to do 
so are void." 
CONCLUSION 
The fact of Judge Friend's former 
partnership with Mr. Wolf and his 
former association with Mr. Rumm 
does not ipso facto disqualify him from 
hearing a matter presented by those 
gentlemen. Such a situation was pre-
sented to the American Bar Associa-
tion 's Standing Committee on Profes-
sional Ethics in October of ] 962. In 
its informal opinion number 594, the 
Committee stated that there was no 
canon of judicial ethics directly requir-
ing an Associate Justice of the Supreme 
Court of Arkansas to disqualify himself 
from sitting in cases in which a party 
was represented by the law firm of 
which he was a former member, par-
ticularly after the lapse of several years 
from the date of enrobing. The Com-
mittee concluded: "In the final analysis 
it must be left to the good judgment 
and conscience of the individual judge." 
But the point of view expressed by 
the Committee presupposes that all 
parties know of the former association 
prior to the judge's sitting in the case. 
It is an entirely different matter for a 
judge to hear a case where he and his 
former associates have failed to dis-
close such an association to opposing 
counsel. The right granted by Code of 
Civil Procedure § 170.6 cannot be held 
to be waived until a party is actually or 
constructively in possession of sufficient 
information for him to intelligently 
make a choice as to whether the judge 
should try his case. 
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There must be no imputation of in-
tentional wrongdoing on the part of 
Judge Friend. But a presumption of 
good intentions does not resolve this 
important question. 
It is clear that the reason behind the 
peremptory challenge authorized by 
Code of Civil Procedure § 170.6 is to 
avoid the appearance of bias, so as to 
serve the greater purpose of protecting 
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the integrity of and respect for the ju-
diciary, and therefore the legal proc-
ess. Lack of precedent arises mainly 
from the unpublished but pervasive 
practice of voluntary disclosure of pos-
sible grounds for disqualification. How-
ever, an appellate court will one day be 
called on to deal with this important 
question. Its answer will be enlight-
ening to the bench and bar alike . .. .. .. 
COMMITTEE ACTIVITIES 
The Functions of the Ethics and Arbitration Committee 
Few members seem to be aware of 
the existence or the functions of the 
Ethics and Arbitration Committee of 
the Beverly Hills Bar Association. 
The Committee is charged with con-
sidering "inquiries from members re-
garding matters of professional conduct 
or ethics" and assisting " in resolving 
complaints or disputes between mem-
bers or between clients and members" 
and "to serve as arbitrators where dis-
putants agree." 
The Committee provides an arbitra-
tion service where there is a fee dis-
pute, either between two or more at-
torneys or between attorneys and 
clients . Under its rules, the Commit-
tee cannot accept any other disputes 
for arbitration, unless the dispute is 
referred to it by the Board of Governors 
of the Association. As in other arbi-
tration proceedings, the Committee 
cannot provide arbitrators for a dispute 
without the agreement of the parties to 
the dispute . 
At the request of a member of the 
Association, the Committee will render 
a written opinion regarding matters of 
profess ional conduct or ethics. Need-
less to say, such an opinion wilI be ad-
visory only. 
The Committee recently adopted 
comprehensive rules covering the selec-
tion of arbitrators and the conduct of 
arbitration proceedings. A copy of 
the Rules can be obtained by request 
from the Association offices. Any ar-
bitration proceeding before the Com-
mittee will result in written findings and 
a decision. 
The arbitration functions of the 
Committee are recommended in mat-
ters involving fee disputes for several 
reasons. First, it is good public rela-
tions for attorneys who become in-
volved in fee disputes with their clients 
to submit the dispute to arbitration. 
This provides both parties with a con-
venient, inexpensive and relatively in-
formal forum for the resolution of the 
dispute. Second, the disputants are af-
forded a forum in which they can ob-
tain a rapid decision when compared 
to the time consumed in the courts. 
And third , if need be, the decision can 
be reduced to a judgment (CCP § 1285, 
et seq.). 
Next time you wonder about your 
ethical position if you take some ac-
tion , or some client objects to or re-
fuses to pay your bill because he con-
tends it is too high, we recommend to 
you the services of your Ethics and 
Arbitration Committee. 
NORMAN D. ROSE 
Chairman, Ethics and 
Arbitration Committee BHBA 
